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In everyday life people may act automatically, following “unwanted” lines of action which
are triggered by contextual cues and may interfere with current goals. Such occurrences
are known as “capture errors” in reference to errors that occur when a more salient
behaviour takes place when a similar, but less salient, action was intended. Clinical neu-
ropsychological studies suggest that reactivation of previous rules may play an important
role in behavioural interference, but such reactivation has been little studied in normal
subjects and simple experimental tasks. In the present study we develop this theme,
presenting data on 4 subjects who spontaneously showed capture errors in verbal fluency
tasks, and developing a new experimental paradigm specifically designed to elicit such
interference in normal subjects. In the new paradigm, 101 normal subjects performed a
simple series of working memory tasks, including occasional stimuli whose answer
matched both the current and the previous rule. We found that normal controls indeed
tend to commit more mistakes after the presentation of a stimulus whose answer is
consistent with a current and preceding rule. In this case, however, the errors produced are
not necessarily associated with a shift back to the old rule, suggesting that rule reactivation
leads to a more general interference effect. We discuss the importance of our data from
both theoretical and clinical perspectives.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Neurology (INECO), Neur
oca).
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In many everyday situations, people act disregarding their
explicitly intended goals, automatically following other lines
of actions that were not part of their original plan. An example
of this not infrequent situation could be the following: one
morning you get up with the clear intention to do something,
for instance to electronically pay your bills. When you turn on
your computer and click the browser icon, your emails get in
your way. Your original idea fizzles and another goal takes
charge. You start reading and replying to emails, including
some which are clearly much less important than having the
power cut off due to lack of payment (which, by the way, will
end any further possibility of reading your emails). This “un-
wanted” behaviour seems to be automatically triggered by
cues in the context that drag us to other lines of action
interfering with our original aims and goals. In the given
example, the sole glance at the browser icon is enough to
make you disregard your original plan. This replacement of
some goals with others happens in countless situations of
everyday life and most of us live with it, without further
consequences.
In human psychology, such occurrences have been
described as “slips” or “capture errors”, referring to errors that
occur when a more salient or practised behaviour takes place
when a similar, but less salient, actionwas intended (Norman,
1981, 1983; Reason, 1990). This term has been widely used in
different fields including client usability, and in both medical
and legal psychology. In one case, for example, two police
officers claimed to have shot a suspect while supposedly
intending to use their taser (Shoichet, Morris, & Lavandera,
2015). Even if the importance of such mistakes has long been
recognized, there is notmuch research performed to elucidate
which variablese regarding the subject and the action context
e predispose to this kind of error in normal subjects.
Patientswith frontal lobe pathology show slips and capture
errors at multiple levels. In anarchic hand, for example, ob-
jects in the environmentmay draw out compulsive, unwanted
actions from the affected hand (Della Sala, Marchetti, &
Spinnler, 1991; Riddoch, Edwards, Humphreys, West, &
Heafield, 1998). In action disorganization syndrome, familiar
sequences of behaviour are interrupted by frequent in-
trusions, including re-insertions of a step already completed
(Humphreys & Forde, 1998; Schwartz, Reed, Montgomery,
Palmer, & Mayer, 1991). In “goal neglect” (Duncan, Emslie,
Williams, Johnson, & Freer, 1996), behaviour is captured by
the wrong element of a novel task, even though the patient
clearly understands and states what behaviour is required. In
the Duncan et al. (1996) study, participants were asked to
perform a simple monitoring task involving pairs of letters
and numbers. Subjects were directed by a main cue (“WATCH
LEFT” or “WATCH RIGHT”) and were asked to name the letters
appearing on the side indicated by the cue while ignoring
digits. Near the end of each trial, a second, more abstract cue
(a plus or minus symbol) appeared and directed participants
to two possible lines of action: if a minus appeared then
subjects should start naming the letters on the left, no matter
which side they had previously been watching, and if a plus
appeared, the subject should name letters from the right. OnPlease cite this article in press as: Roca, M., et al., Rule reactivation an
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continue to answer as they had been doing earlier (WATCH
RIGHT followed by a þ; WATCH LEFT followed by a ) and on
other trials the sign meant that they had to shift their
response (WATCH RIGHT followed by a ; WATCH LEFT fol-
lowed by a þ). Duncan et al. (1996) found that some partici-
pants tended to neglect the second and more abstract rule
even if they could recall it at the beginning and at the end of
the task. Even though they knew they should respond to the
cue, they systematically ignored it, appearing “captured” by
the initial part of the task. After this paper, similar behaviour
has been repeatedly reported using different research para-
digms and it has been described in children, older adults and
multiple clinical populations (Bhandari & Duncan, 2014;
Duncan et al., 2008; Duncan, Schramm, Thompson, &
Dumontheil, 2012; Nieuwenhuis, Broerse, Nielsen, & de Jong,
2004; Roca et al., 2014; Towse, Lewis, & Knowles, 2007;
Westbrook, Martins, Yarkoni, & Braver, 2012).
Certain subject characteristics such as age, fluid intelli-
gence, and working memory capacity seem to be related to
goal neglect behaviour. Children and older adults seem to
have a tendency to present this behaviour (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2004; Towse et al., 2007; Westbrook et al., 2012), as do people
with lower scores on fluid intelligence tests (Bhandari &
Duncan, 2014; Duncan et al., 1996, 2008; Kane & Engle, 2002)
or poor working memory capacity (Kane & Engle, 2002;
Oberauer, 2010).
Though some task characteristics are known to influence
goal neglect e such as task complexity and progress within a
task (Bhandari&Duncan, 2014; Duncan et al., 2008, 2012; Kane
& Engle, 2002) e much less is known about how particular
stimuli can provoke this brain stumble. Here we take our lead
from a study of capture errors in frontal patients reported by
Reverberi, Lavaroni, Gigli, Skrap, and Shallice (2005). These
authors used a modified form of the well-known Brixton
spatial anticipation task (Burgess & Shallice, 1996) in which
participants are presented with a series of cards containing a
display of circles one of which is blue. The main goal of the
subject is to anticipate which circle will be the blue one in the
following card, by inferring the rule from previous cards. The
Reverberi version of the task (2005) adds an interesting rule
interference component. Once the rule is inferred, 4 cards
with a red circle, following a different rule, appear. The subject
is explicitly told that in those cards he should only touch the
red circle, and that those cards are irrelevant to themain task.
The subject is also told that after the red cards the blue circle
will always continue to follow the same rule as before the
interruption and that this preceding rule is the one the subject
has to follow once the series of red circles finishes. Interest-
ingly, the succession of the interfering red cards is arranged so
that the position of the next blue card fits the rule of both red
and blue circles. Under these circumstances, Reverberi et al.
(2005) found that, when the next blue card was presented,
some frontal patients followed the interfering (red card) rule,
rather reverting to the correct (blue card) rule. Such results
suggest that the conjoint activation of two rules may play an
important role in rule interference. In this study, however, the
first blue card following a series of reds always fit both rules,
making it uncertain whether this double match was crucial ind capture errors in goal directed behaviour, Cortex (2017), http://
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studies exploring similar capture in normal subjects.
In clinical neuropsychology, a similar kind of mistake is
also sometimes observed in simpler tasks, such as verbal
fluency. In verbal fluency tasks, subjects are asked to generate
as many items as possible from a given category in a fixed
time. Classically, a phonemic and a semantic version are used.
In the first, the subject is asked to generate words beginning
with a given letter e for example “f” ewhile in the second, the
subject is asked to generate words from a given category e for
example animals or types of food. Interestingly, when the two
tests are presented in succession, it is not rare to find some-
thing like the “capture errors” previously described. That is,
the old rule e for example generating words with the letter “f”
e is re-activated in the semantic fluency task, if by chance an
answer coherent with both rules is produced. For example,
during the animal fluency task, if the subject arbitrarily says
the word “fox”, then the old rule may interfere and he/she
starts generating animals exclusively starting with the letter
“f” or, in a more severe case, may even revert to the old rule,
generating words beginning with “f” whether or not they
match the required semantic category.
In the present study we develop this theme of interference
arising when a response is coherent both with a current task
rule and a previous, now irrelevant rule. First, we present data
on4 subjectswhospontaneously showed this kindof behaviour
in verbal fluency tasks. Then, we present data from an experi-
mental paradigm specifically designed to elicit such interfer-
ence. In this study 101 normal subjects performed a simple
series of neuropsychological tasks, including occasional stimuli
whose answermatched both the current and the previous rule.
Weexamine interference induced by such doublematches, and
relate it to a number of task characteristics.2. Cases
In this section we present data on 4 subjects who spontane-
ously showed capture behaviour in verbal fluency tasks. The 4
cases were retrospectively identified from a group of 52 sub-
jects thatwere part of an ongoing investigation onAlzheimer's
Disease and Fronto-temporal Dementia (FTD). Of the subjects
reviewed, 10 were cases of progressive primary aphasia, 16
cases of behavioural variant FTD, 9 cases of Alzheimer's dis-
ease and 17 healthy controls. As part of the study, patients
were assessed with a complete neuropsychological battery
that included a phonological verbal fluency task immediately
followed by a categorical verbal fluency task. First, the subject
was asked to produce as many words as possible beginning
with the letter “p” in 1 min. After this task was finished, sub-
jects were asked to produce as many animals as possible in
1 min. Subjects were explicitly told that they could mention
any animal, disregarding the initial letter.
2.1. Case 1
FM was a right-handed 70-year-old male who initially pre-
sentedwith behavioural disorders and attentional deficits. His
family reported apathy, irritability and appetite augmenta-
tion. No memory, language, visuoperceptual or orientationPlease cite this article in press as: Roca, M., et al., Rule reactivation an
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ment showed difficulties in executive functions, theory of
mind and multitasking, while memory, language and praxis
were preserved. Brain MRI indicated moderate bilateral fron-
tal involution. FM received a diagnosis of the behavioural
variant of FTD and was invited to take part in the study.When
presented with the phonological verbal fluency task, he pro-
duced 6 words in the allowed 1 min. Afterwards, when pre-
sented with the categorical verbal fluency task, after correctly
mentioning 4 animals, he produced an animal whose initial
letter was the letter “p”. Immediately after, he switched to the
former task and started to produce words with the letter “p”
that were not animals till the task was finished. Of note, the
first animal produced also started with the letter “p”.
2.2. Case 2
DF was a right-handed 64-year-old male IT technician. When
he was 61 years old he presented progressive behavioural
changes and emotional liability. Within 2 years his deficits
progressed to other cognitive functions including memory
and language, with word finding difficulties. Behavioural
deficits became more prominent including hyperorality and
marked inappropriate behaviours. MRI indicated clear bilat-
eral frontotemporal involution with left frontal predomi-
nance. DF received a diagnosis of behavioural variant of FTD
and was invited to take part in the study. When presented
with the phonological verbal fluency task, he produced 7
words in the allowed 1min.When subsequently he was asked
to generate animals, he produced 3 in the first 15 sec, with the
first one starting with the letter “p”. Around second 15 he
produced a new animal beginning with the letter “p” and then
switched back to the former task, producing a word with the
letter “p” that was not an animal.
2.3. Case 3
DGwas a right-handed 79 year old womanwho complained of
widespread musculoskeletal pain and fatigue, within many
other physical symptoms. Given other transient symptoms
such as dizziness, tension headache, tinnitus, cold feet, dry
mouth and difficulty to swallow, shewas seen by doctors from
different specialities. She did not present pathological find-
ings during her neurological examination nor any other
explanation for her symptoms. An informant reported other
changes of behaviour including cognitive rigidity and
perseverative behaviours and thoughts. Her brain SPECT
showed hypoperfusion in bilateral anterior andmedial frontal
lobes. When she was presented with the phonological fluency
task, she produced 16 words in the given minute. Subse-
quently, in the categorical fluency task around second 15, she
produced an animal which started with the letter “p”. Imme-
diately afterwards she produced a word starting with the let-
ter “p” that was not an animal.
2.4. Case 4
MH was a right-handed 70-year-old female lawyer who vol-
unteered to participate in the study as a control subject. She
reported no cognitive or behavioural problems.When shewasd capture errors in goal directed behaviour, Cortex (2017), http://
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produced 15 words in the allowed 1 min. Subsequently, when
she was asked to generate animals, she produced 8 in the first
30 sec. Around second 30 she generated an animal beginning
with the letter “p” and then reverted to producing “p” words
that were not animals.3. Materials and methods
3.1. Participants
A sample of 101 healthy subjects was included in the study.
Subjects were selected by the absence of prior neurological
background, substance abuse or psychiatric antecedents. The
mean age of subjects was 51 years (SD ¼ 22.1; range ¼ 18e90)
and mean education level was 13.72 years (SD ¼ 4.96;
range ¼ 3e30). Subjects were recruited by word of mouth and
were not taking anymedications indicating medical problems
at the time of assessment. Subjects were evaluated individu-
ally in a suitable examination room. Permission for the study
was obtained from the local research ethics committee in
accordance with the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki and all
subjects gave their informed consent.
3.2. Capture error task
The study used 4 simple tasks, involving verbal working
memory for lists of numbers or numbers and letters. In each
trial, a list was read aloud by the experimenter one digit or
letter per second. A simple rule determined the correct order
of repeating it back, with 4 different rules for the 4 different
tasks. The first task was only included to consolidate the first
rule and was not included in the statistical analysis. Each task
consisted of 30 trials, and from the second to the fourth, it
included 3 different types of stimulus: A) Trigger stimulus
(TRIG; 6/30) which were lists for which the answer was the
same for the current task and the immediately preceding one,
in order to re-activate the previous and now irrelevant rule; B)
Stumble stimulus (STMB; 6/30) which were the trials imme-
diately following a TRIG, predicted to show more errors given
the reactivation of the previous rule on the TRIG trial; and C)
Regular stimulus (REG) which were all the remainder of the
trials. TRIG stimuli were randomly distributed across the 30
trials of each task, with the exception of the first stimulus,
which was always a TRIG in order to maximise the probability
of reawakening the previous rule.
To manipulate the influence of working memory load
(WML), the experiment was divided into two halves. The first
half of the experiment used two item lists, with the 4 tasks
performed in turn (30 trials/task). Then in the second half of
the experiment, the whole cycle of 4 tasks was repeated with
four item lists. The whole experiment took an average of
40 min to be completed.
In each half of the experiment, tasks were given in the
following order. The complete list of stimuli for all tasks is
shown in Supplementary Materials.
Digit Forward Repetition (DF): The subject was presented
with numbers andwas asked to repeat them in the same order
as presented. No TRIG stimuli were included.Please cite this article in press as: Roca, M., et al., Rule reactivation an
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were presented with numbers and were asked to repeat them
in the reverse order from that in which they were presented.
For this task, TRIGs consisted of stimuli for which the correct
answer is the same forwards and backwards, meeting criteria
for the former and current rule at the same time (example: 2-
8-8-2).
Letter and Number Organization (LNO): Subjects were now
presented with numbers and letters, and were asked to repeat
them in the order: first numbers in ascending order; then
letters in alphabetical order. This taskwas included in order to
investigate the effect of rule complexity, since it involves the
same number of working memory items as DB but applying a
more complex rule. For this task, TRIG stimuli were composed
of letters and numbers presented in such a way that saying
them backwards would produce the same answer assaying
them following the LNO rule (for example: L e A e 4 e 1).
Letters and Numbers Backward Repetition (LNB): Subjects were
presented with numbers and letters and were asked to repeat
them in the reverse order from that in which they were pre-
sented. This task was included to investigate the effect of rule
complexity versus stimulus complexity, since it equals the
rule complexity of DB but the stimulus complexity of LNO. For
this task, TRIG stimuli were composed of letters and numbers
presented in such a way that saying them following the letter
and number organization rule would produce the same
answer as said backwards (for example: L e A e 4 e 1).
3.3. Data analysis
For the statistical analysis, we measured the percentage of
errors separately for TRIG, STMB and REG trials. We used
repeated measures ANOVA in which we included as within
subject measures: a) stimulus type (TRIG, STMB and REG), and
b) task (DB, LNO and LNB). To examine the effect of WML, we
used a separate repeated measures ANOVA including within
subjects measures: a) stimulus type (TRIG, STMB and REG), b)
task complexity (LNO and LNB), and c)WML (high and low). DB
was removed from this analysis as the variance of the lowWM
condition was insufficient. We used a Tukey HSD test to
contrast differences between conditions (p < .05). Pearson's
correlations were calculated between performance and age,
years of education and fluid intelligence measured by the
matrix reasoning task (Wechsler, 1997).4. Results
4.1. Type of stimulus effect
Error percentages for each task and stimulus type are shown
in Fig. 1. Data are means across the two levels of WML. To
investigate the effects of a response consistent with the rules
of both the current and the preceding task, we compared er-
rors for TRIG, STMB and REG stimuli. As expected, we
observed a significant effect of stimulus type [F (2,200)¼ 28.04;
p < .001; h2 ¼ .524]. A post hoc analysis (Tukey's HSD,
MS ¼ 214.30; df ¼ 200.00), showed that participants performed
significantly more poorly in STMB compared to both other
stimulus types (error rate STMB > TRIG: p < .001; STMB > REG:d capture errors in goal directed behaviour, Cortex (2017), http://
Fig. 1 e Interaction between stimulus and task. Box plots
show the significant stimulus effect, where participants
exhibited a higher percentage of errors on the STMB
stimulus. The dot represents the mean, the box the
mean ± SE, and the whiskers the mean ± .95 confidence
intervals. A. Stimulus in the Digit Backwards Repetition
(DB) task. B. Stimulus in the Letters and Numbers
Backward Repetition (LNB) task. C. Stimulus in the Letter
and Number Organization (LNO) task. TRIG: trigger
stimulus; STMB: stumble stimulus; REG: regular stimulus.
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p < .001). Poor performance on STMB trials confirms the dis-
turbing effect of TRIG stimuli in reawakening the previous
rule. Reawakening of the previous rule could also have
contributed to good performance on TRIG stimuli themselves,
forwhich the reawakened rulewas consistent with the correct
response. It is also worth noting, however, that TRIG stimuli
were relatively simple in the DB task, since they necessarily
contained repeated numbers (e.g., 2-8-8-2).
4.2. Task effect
There was a significant effect of task type, F (2, 200) ¼ 43.17;
p < .001; h2 ¼ .302. A post hoc analysis (Tukey's HSD,
MS ¼ 395.23; df ¼ 200.00) showed that participants performed
significantly more poorly in LNB compared to both other tasks
(error rate LNB > LNO: p < .001; LNB > DB: p < .001). There was
also a higher error rate in LNO compared to DB (p ¼ .003) (see
Fig. 1).
In addition, there was a significant interaction between
stimulus type and task type, F (4,400)¼ 6.62; p < .001; h2 ¼ .062.
Post hoc tests (Tukey's HSD, MS ¼ 150.34; df ¼ 400.00) showed
that in LNB task, error rate for STMBwas higher than for either
REG or TRIG (both p < .001). Therewas no significant difference
between TRIG and REG stimuli (p ¼ .470). In DB task, both
STMB (p < .001) and REG (p ¼ .023) showed higher error rate
than TRIG. Last, in LNO, there was no difference between
STMB and TRIG (p ¼ .096), nor between STMB and REG
(p ¼ .670).
4.3. Working memory effect
As we expected, we found significant effects of WML [F
(1,100) ¼ 95,602; p < .001; h2 ¼ .489], with lower performance
during the high WML condition. Fig. 2 shows a ceiling effect
for the Low WML condition, with high accuracy for all stim-
ulus types.
We found a significant interaction between stimulus type
and WML [F (2,200) ¼ 10,257; p < .001; h2 ¼ .165]. Post hoc an-
alyses (Tukey's HSD, MS ¼ 156.39; df ¼ 200.00) revealed that
TRIG stimuli significantly differed from both STMB (p < .001)
and REG (p < .001) stimuli in the high WML condition. No
significant differences between stimuli were observed in the
Low WML condition.
4.4. Types of error
A final analysis concerned the nature of errors, in particular
for four-item lists. For STMB and REG stimuli, the four items in
a list were always all different (see Supplementary Materials),
meaning that, if all items were reported, they could be in one
of 24 possible orders. Of these, one order was correct, one was
the order consistent with the preceding task (“back to old
rule”, BOR), and the remaining 22 were other order errors
(NoBOR). No similar analysis was possible for two-item lists,
with only one possible order error, or for TRIG stimuli, where
the BOR response was correct.
To see if TRIG stimuli specifically induced BOR errors, we
performed repeated measures ANOVAs separately for eachd capture errors in goal directed behaviour, Cortex (2017), http://
Fig. 2 e Effect of working memory load. Errors were
significantly higher in the high WML condition than in the
low WML condition. White dots represent the mean, the
box the mean ± SE, and the whiskers the mean ± .95
confidence intervals. A. Stimulus in the high working
memory load lists. B. Stimulus in the low working memory
load conditions. TRIG: trigger stimulus; STMB: stumble
stimulus; REG: regular stimulus.
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1e86task, contrasting STMB, the trial that immediately followed a
STMB (STMBþ1), and all other REG stimuli (REG). BOR errors
were very infrequent, and ANOVA showed no effect of stim-
ulus type in the DB [F (2,200)¼ .284; p¼ .753; h2¼ .003] and LNB
tasks [F (2,200)¼ .459; p¼ .633; h2¼ .918]. In the LNO task there
were no BOR errors.
Regarding the number ofNoBOR errors,we found significant
differences in the LNO [F (2,200)¼ 17,144; p < .001; h2¼ .146] and
LNB tasks [F (2,200) ¼ 14,589; p < .001; h2 ¼ .127]. Post hocPlease cite this article in press as: Roca, M., et al., Rule reactivation an
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2017.08.027analyses revealed that in the LNO task (Tukey's HSD,
MS¼ 158.87; df¼ 200.00) NoBOR errors were higher for STMBþ1
stimuli compared to STMB (p< .001) and REG (p< .001) stimulus.
For LNB task (Tukey's HSD, MS ¼ 83.43; df ¼ 200.00) NoBOR er-
rors were higher for STMB compared to STMBþ1 (p ¼ .004) and
REG (p < .001). The DB task also showed no difference between
stimulus types in the number of NoBOR errors (F (2,200)¼ 1408;
p ¼ .247; h2 ¼ 2.816). These data show that, although a TRIG
stimulus induced order errors in the following trial, in partic-
ular in LNO and LNB, these errors were not specifically re-
sponses consistent with the preceding task's rule.5. Discussion
In the present study we examined a form of rule competition
in sequential behaviour. Specifically we showed interference
arising when a response generated according to a current task
rule happens to be consistentwith the rule of a preceding task.
To illustrate this, we first presented data on subjects drawn
from an ongoing study of Alzheimer's disease and FTD. Of 52
cases retrospectively analysed, 4 showed a striking form of
rule capture in verbal fluency tasks. All subjects performed a
phonemic fluency task followed by a semantic fluency task. In
each case, during the semantic fluency task, when a word
beginning with the previously used letter happened to be
generated, the subject reverted to the previous task, gener-
ating words that began with the letter used in the phonemic
fluency task. Interestingly, of the 4 subjects showing this
behaviour, 3 were suffering from the behavioural variant of
FTD, while the fourth was a control subject. It seems likely
that capture errors of this sort can be found in multiple pop-
ulations, especially in patients with frontal dysfunction.
To further investigate this behaviour and its interaction
with task and subject characteristics, we designed a new
experimental paradigm. A large sample of normal subjects
was presented with a simple series of working memory tasks,
with rules changing from one task to the next. Occasionally,
the correct answer for a stimulus list also matched the rule of
the preceding task. When this occurred, error rate increased
on the following trial. This effect was most visible in a task
combining high stimulus complexity with a relatively simple
response rule. It was also dependent onWML, being seen only
in four-item but not two-item conditions.
Strikingly, when the types of errors produced were ana-
lysed, errors were not specifically responses consistent with
the preceding task's rule. In this regard, unlike the data from
verbal fluency, findings in our experimental task do not sug-
gest a simple disappearance of the current rule and re-
emergence of the previous one. Instead, our results suggest
that the presentation of a stimulus whose answer is simul-
taneously compatible with a current and a previous rule
generates interference with the task being performed and a
general disturbance in use of the correct rule. This interfer-
ence is reflected in an overall increase in order errors. At least
for normal subjects, our data suggest that a TRIG stimulus is
not enough to prompt a complete switch back to a previous
mode of responding. We suggest that a stimulus that is
congruent both with a current and a previous rule interferes
with current rule application both in normal subjects and ind capture errors in goal directed behaviour, Cortex (2017), http://
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1e8 7clinical populations. Complete hijacking by a previous rule,
however, may only be common in clinical populations.
Testing this hypothesis will require testing of clinical and
normal populations under the same conditions.
A further finding was reduction of error rate on TRIG trials,
where the response required on the current trial was consis-
tent both with the current rule, and with the rule of the pre-
ceding task. Although these results could suggest some
remaining activation of a previous rule, the fact that better
performance in TRIG stimuli was significant only in the DB
condition suggests a role of stimulus complexity. In the DB
condition, TRIG stimuli were unlike others in that they
included repeated items (e.g., a TRIG stimulus in DB would be
2-2 or 2-4-4-2 while a REG or TMBL stimulus would be 5-2 or 7-
3-1-9).
Here we have studied interference between the rules of
two tasks performed in succession, in separate trial blocks.
Our results have some similarities to findings in tasks like the
Stroop or Eriksen flanker, which address interference between
responses induced by different aspects of a current stimulus
(e.g., Stroop, name ink colour, ignore written word). In tasks of
this sort, it is common to compare congruent stimuli e for
which relevant and irrelevant stimulus features indicate the
same response (e.g., Stroop, word RED written in red ink) e
with incongruent stimuli e for which the two features indi-
cate different responses (e.g., Stroop, word RED written in
green ink). In some respects, our TRIG stimuli resemble a
Stroop or Eriksen congruent (both current and preceding rules
lead to the same response), while other stimuli (STMB and
REG) resemble a Stroop or Eriksen incongruent. In tasks like
Stroop and Eriksen, reaction time on an incongruent trial is
generally longer when the preceding trial was congruent
(Gratton effect, see Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992), precisely
in line with our finding of increased errors for STMB, which
follows a congruent TRIG. The most influential account of the
Gratton effect proposes that, after an incongruent trial, sup-
pression of the unwanted stimulus feature/task rule is
strengthened, speeding performance if the next trial is also
incongruent (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001).
Others have argued that, complementarily, a congruent may
encourage processing of the irrelevant feature, impairing
performance if the next trial is incongruent (e.g., Lamers &
Roelofs, 2011). Though here we address a rather different
type of interference, occurring between successive tasks over
a longer time-scale, similar underlying control mechanisms
may be at play.
The context in which daily activities take place is full of
distractors, potentially interfering with the path to our goals.
To avoid incorrect choices, we must precisely select actions
which will lead us towards achieving our main goals. Count-
less examples of slips and capture errors can be found in
everyday life, such as the described hijacking of your intention
to pay your bills by your e-mails or when you end up accepting
a call in your phone when you did not intended to do so. The
present investigation illustrates the role of goal competition
on such kind of mistakes both in clinical subjects and in
healthy adults. We showed that in some cases the simple
presentation of a response coherent with a previous rule can
make some subjects shift back to it. We also showed that, in
normal subjects, reactivation of a previous rule can interferePlease cite this article in press as: Roca, M., et al., Rule reactivation an
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2017.08.027with simple tasks, even if there is no complete shift back to
the previous rule. Such reactivation can interfere with goal
management even in simple tasks with no rule induction
components, and even with just a single triggering stimulus.
A woman gets up with the clear intention to electronically
pay her bills but clicking the browser icon awakens the
familiar process of checking her emails. Although he has
previously refused to join the family football game, a profes-
sional footballer gets up and starts to play once the other
parents “accidentally” kick the ball to his feet. This abduction
of some goals over others happens in countless situations of
everyday life, and sometimes, the consequences are serious
(Norman, 1981, 1983; Reason, 1990). Accordingly, under-
standing and avoiding suchmistakes is of great importance in
multiple fields, from client usability in software programming
to the design of medical practices and equipment.
Further investigations should be performed both in
vulnerable populations e such as children, older subjects and
patients with frontal dysfunction e and using different
cognitive paradigms. This will allow us to better understand
the strength and extent of this phenomenon. Such knowledge
could be a starting point to design rehabilitation strategies
focussed on stimulus interference control for goal manage-
ment deficits observed in clinical populations.6. Conclusions
The investigation of human error and the factors that can
predispose to it is of great importance for different fields. In
the present study we showed how the generation of an
answer which is congruent both with a current and previous
rule can disrupt performance. While in patients with fronto-
temporal dementia such mistakes seem to be related to a
complete reversion to the previous rule, in normal subjects it
seems to interfere more generally with performance, pro-
ducing errors not necessarily associated with a shift back to
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